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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC 6/9] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
>>> On 02.07.14 at 18:06, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 07/02/2014 06:51 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 02.07.14 at 15:33, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> Added new XEN_DOMCTL_set_pagefault_info hypercall, used by libxc's
>>> new xc_domain_set_pagefault_info() function to set per-domain page
>>> fault injection information. This information is then used to call
>>> hvm_inject_page_fault() at the first VMENTRY where the guest status
>>> matches and there are no other pending traps.
>>
>> So the first question that strikes me here: What good can it do to be
>> able to inject arbitrary page faults, possibly at times where the guest
>> OS is absolutely not expecting them?
>
> The guest, as Andrew Cooper said, is waiting for a mem_event reply.
>
>>> @@ -430,6 +431,9 @@ static void vmx_vmcs_save(struct vcpu *v, struct
> hvm_hw_cpu *c)
>>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, &c->sysenter_cs);
>>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, &c->sysenter_esp);
>>> __vmread(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, &c->sysenter_eip);
>>> + __vmread(GUEST_CS_AR_BYTES, &cs_arbytes);
>>> +
>>> + c->cs_arbytes = (uint32_t)cs_arbytes;
>>
>> This again looks like an unrelated change without any explanation.
>
> It's used here, to check if we're in user mode before injecting the page
> fault:
Okay.
> 92 +static void check_pf_injection(void)
> 93 +{
> 94 + struct vcpu *curr = current;
> 95 + struct domain *d = curr->domain;
> 96 + struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt;
> 97 + uint32_t cs_dpl;
> 98 +
> 99 + if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || d->fault_info.virtual_address == 0 )
> 100 + return;
> 101 +
> 102 + memset(&ctxt, 0, sizeof(struct hvm_hw_cpu));
> 103 + hvm_funcs.save_cpu_ctxt(curr, &ctxt);
> 104 +
> 105 + cs_dpl = (ctxt.cs_arbytes >> 5) & 3;
> 106 +
> 107 + if ( cs_dpl == 3 /* Guest is in user mode */
Which is yet another example of trying to determine the CPL by
looking at CS.DPL - SS.DPL is the canonical value for that.
Jan
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