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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next v2 1/9] xen-netback: Introduce TX grant map definitions



On 13/12/13 15:31, Wei Liu wrote:
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 11:48:09PM +0000, Zoltan Kiss wrote:
This patch contains the new definitions necessary for grant mapping.

v2:
- move unmapping to separate thread. The NAPI instance has to be scheduled
   even from thread context, which can cause huge delays
- that causes unfortunately bigger struct xenvif
- store grant handle after checking validity


If the size of xenvif really becomes a problem, you can try to make
sratch space like struct gnttab_copy per-cpu. The downside is that
approach requires much coding and carefully guard against race
conditions. You would need to consider cost v.s. benefit.

I mentioned this because for the first series I had comments that I should be more vigilant about this. At that time there was a problem with struct xenvif allocation which was solved by now. My quick calculation showed this patch will increase the size with ~15kb


Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@xxxxxxxxxx>

---
[...]
  #define XENVIF_QUEUE_LENGTH 32
  #define XENVIF_NAPI_WEIGHT  64
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c 
b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index c1b7a42..3ddc474 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -772,6 +772,20 @@ static struct page *xenvif_alloc_page(struct xenvif *vif,
        return page;
  }

+static inline void xenvif_tx_create_gop(struct xenvif *vif, u16 pending_idx,
+              struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
+              struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop)
+{
+       vif->pages_to_map[gop-vif->tx_map_ops] = vif->mmap_pages[pending_idx];
+       gnttab_set_map_op(gop, idx_to_kaddr(vif, pending_idx),
+                         GNTMAP_host_map | GNTMAP_readonly,
+                         txp->gref, vif->domid);
+
+       memcpy(&vif->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, txp,
+              sizeof(*txp));
+
+}
+

This helper function is not used until next patch. Probably you can move
it to the second patch.

The same applies to other helper functions as well. Move them to the
patch they are used. It would be easier for people to review.
I just moved them here because the second patch is already huge, and I couldn't have an idea to splice it up while keeping it bisectable and logically consistent. As I mentioned, I welcome ideas about that.


  static struct gnttab_copy *xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
                                               struct sk_buff *skb,
                                               struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
@@ -1593,6 +1607,106 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif *vif)
        return work_done;
  }

+void xenvif_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf_info *ubuf, bool zerocopy_success)
+{

Do we care about zerocopy_success? I don't see it used in this function.
It will be used in the 5th patch. Anyway, it's in the definition of the zerocopy callback.


+       unsigned long flags;
+       pending_ring_idx_t index;
+       u16 pending_idx = ubuf->desc;
+       struct pending_tx_info *temp =
+               container_of(ubuf, struct pending_tx_info, callback_struct);
+       struct xenvif *vif =
+               container_of(temp - pending_idx, struct xenvif,
+                       pending_tx_info[0]);
+

The third parameter to container_of should be the name of the member
within the struct.
Here we have the pending_idx, so we get a pointer for the holding struct pending_tx_info, then for the beginning of pending_tx_info (temp - pending_idx), and then to the struct xenvif. It's a bit tricky and not straightforward, I admit :)


+       spin_lock_irqsave(&vif->dealloc_lock, flags);
+       do {
+               pending_idx = ubuf->desc;
+               ubuf = (struct ubuf_info *) ubuf->ctx;
+               index = pending_index(vif->dealloc_prod);
+               vif->dealloc_ring[index] = pending_idx;
+               /* Sync with xenvif_tx_action_dealloc:
+                * insert idx then incr producer.
+                */
+               smp_wmb();
+               vif->dealloc_prod++;
+       } while (ubuf);
+       wake_up(&vif->dealloc_wq);
+       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vif->dealloc_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static inline void xenvif_tx_dealloc_action(struct xenvif *vif)
+{
+       struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *gop;
+       pending_ring_idx_t dc, dp;
+       u16 pending_idx, pending_idx_release[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
+       unsigned int i = 0;
+
+       dc = vif->dealloc_cons;
+       gop = vif->tx_unmap_ops;
+
+       /* Free up any grants we have finished using */
+       do {
+               dp = vif->dealloc_prod;
+
+               /* Ensure we see all indices enqueued by netif_idx_release(). */

There is no netif_idx_release in netback code. :-)
Oh yes, that's from the classic code, it should be xenvif_zerocopy_callback. I will fix it.


+               smp_rmb();
+
+               while (dc != dp) {
+                       pending_idx =
+                               vif->dealloc_ring[pending_index(dc++)];
+
+                       /* Already unmapped? */
+                       if (vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] ==
+                               NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+                               netdev_err(vif->dev,
+                                       "Trying to unmap invalid handle! "
+                                       "pending_idx: %x\n", pending_idx);
+                               continue;
+                       }

Should this be BUG_ON? AIUI this kthread should be the only one doing
unmap, right?
The NAPI instance can do it as well if it is a small packet fits into PKT_PROT_LEN. But still this scenario shouldn't really happen, I was just not sure we have to crash immediately. Maybe handle it as a fatal error and destroy the vif?



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