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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen/tmem: Fix uses of unmatched __map_domain_page()



On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 02:55:04PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> I noticed this while looking through tmem_xen.h with regards to the
> recently-discovered Coverity issues.  As the issue was not noticed or
> referenced in Bob's cleanup series, I figured it was fair game, given its
> severity.
> 
> __map_domain_page() *must* be matched with an unmap_domain_page().  These five
> static inline functions each map a page (or two), then throw away the context
> needed to unmap it.

I was trying to figure out how it worked before. I had been running with
tze enabled (I hope!) and I did not trigger any mapcache exhaustion.

Ah wait, I had been on my nighly regression system  - which has some
guests that use tmem but they don't create any load fast enough.

Let me queue this up and test it. Bob, would appreciate you testing
it too - just in case.

Thanks!
> 
> Each of the changes are limited to their respective functions.  In two cases,
> this involved replacing a large amount of pointer arithmetic with memcpy()
> (all callers were relying on memcpy() semantics of positive/negative returns
> rather than specifically -1/+1). A third case had its pointer arithmetic
> entirely replaced with memcpy().
> 
> In addition, remove redundant casts of void pointers and assertions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Bob Liu <bob.liu@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> 
> ---
> These changes have been compile tested, but not functionally tested.
> ---
>  xen/include/xen/tmem_xen.h |   78 
> +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/tmem_xen.h b/xen/include/xen/tmem_xen.h
> index b26c6fa..a0d11aa 100644
> --- a/xen/include/xen/tmem_xen.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/tmem_xen.h
> @@ -228,26 +228,24 @@ static inline bool_t tmem_current_is_privileged(void)
>  
>  static inline uint8_t tmem_get_first_byte(struct page_info *pfp)
>  {
> -    void *p = __map_domain_page(pfp);
> +    const uint8_t *p =__map_domain_page(pfp);
> +    uint8_t byte = p[0];
>  
> -    return (uint8_t)(*(char *)p);
> +    unmap_domain_page(p);
> +
> +    return byte;
>  }
>  
>  static inline int tmem_page_cmp(struct page_info *pfp1, struct page_info 
> *pfp2)
>  {
> -    const uint64_t *p1 = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page(pfp1);
> -    const uint64_t *p2 = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page(pfp2);
> -    int i;
> -
> -    // FIXME: code in assembly?
> -ASSERT(p1 != NULL);
> -ASSERT(p2 != NULL);
> -    for ( i = PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(uint64_t); i && *p1 == *p2; i--, p1++, p2++ );
> -    if ( !i )
> -        return 0;
> -    if ( *p1 < *p2 )
> -        return -1;
> -    return 1;
> +    const uint64_t *p1 = __map_domain_page(pfp1);
> +    const uint64_t *p2 = __map_domain_page(pfp2);
> +    int rc = memcmp(p1, p2, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +    unmap_domain_page(p2);
> +    unmap_domain_page(p1);
> +
> +    return rc;
>  }
>  
>  static inline int tmem_pcd_cmp(void *va1, pagesize_t len1, void *va2, 
> pagesize_t len2)
> @@ -271,54 +269,58 @@ static inline int tmem_pcd_cmp(void *va1, pagesize_t 
> len1, void *va2, pagesize_t
>      return 1;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int tmem_tze_pfp_cmp(struct page_info *pfp1, pagesize_t 
> pfp_len, void *tva, pagesize_t tze_len)
> +static inline int tmem_tze_pfp_cmp(struct page_info *pfp1, pagesize_t 
> pfp_len,
> +                                   void *tva, const pagesize_t tze_len)
>  {
> -    const uint64_t *p1 = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page(pfp1);
> -    const uint64_t *p2;
> -    pagesize_t i;
> +    const uint64_t *p1 = __map_domain_page(pfp1);
> +    const uint64_t *p2 = tze_len == PAGE_SIZE ?
> +        __map_domain_page((struct page_info *)tva) : tva;
> +    int rc;
>  
> -    if ( tze_len == PAGE_SIZE )
> -       p2 = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page((struct page_info *)tva);
> -    else
> -       p2 = (uint64_t *)tva;
>      ASSERT(pfp_len <= PAGE_SIZE);
>      ASSERT(!(pfp_len & (sizeof(uint64_t)-1)));
>      ASSERT(tze_len <= PAGE_SIZE);
>      ASSERT(!(tze_len & (sizeof(uint64_t)-1)));
>      if ( pfp_len < tze_len )
> -        return -1;
> -    if ( pfp_len > tze_len )
> -        return 1;
> -    ASSERT(pfp_len == tze_len);
> -    for ( i = tze_len/sizeof(uint64_t); i && *p1 == *p2; i--, p1++, p2++ );
> -    if ( !i )
> -        return 0;
> -    if ( *p1 < *p2 )
> -        return -1;
> -    return 1;
> +        rc = -1;
> +    else if ( pfp_len > tze_len )
> +        rc = 1;
> +    else
> +        rc = memcmp(p1, p2, tze_len);
> +
> +    if ( tze_len == PAGE_SIZE )
> +        unmap_domain_page(p2);
> +    unmap_domain_page(p1);
> +
> +    return rc;
>  }
>  
>  /* return the size of the data in the pfp, ignoring trailing zeroes and
>   * rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8 */
>  static inline pagesize_t tmem_tze_pfp_scan(struct page_info *pfp)
>  {
> -    const uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page(pfp);
> +    const uint64_t *const page = __map_domain_page(pfp);
> +    const uint64_t *p = page;
>      pagesize_t bytecount = PAGE_SIZE;
>      pagesize_t len = PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(uint64_t);
> +
>      p += len;
>      while ( len-- && !*--p )
>          bytecount -= sizeof(uint64_t);
> +
> +    unmap_domain_page(page);
> +
>      return bytecount;
>  }
>  
>  static inline void tmem_tze_copy_from_pfp(void *tva, struct page_info *pfp, 
> pagesize_t len)
>  {
> -    uint64_t *p1 = (uint64_t *)tva;
> -    const uint64_t *p2 = (uint64_t *)__map_domain_page(pfp);
> +    const uint64_t *p = __map_domain_page(pfp);
>  
> -    pagesize_t i;
>      ASSERT(!(len & (sizeof(uint64_t)-1)));
> -    for ( i = len/sizeof(uint64_t); i--; *p1++ = *p2++);
> +    memcpy(tva, p, len);
> +
> +    unmap_domain_page(p);
>  }
>  
>  /* these typedefs are in the public/tmem.h interface
> -- 
> 1.7.10.4
> 

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