Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3 V3] XSA-60 security hole: cr0.cd handling

[Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>]

At 15:55 +0000 on 21 Oct (1382367312), Liu, Jinsong wrote:
> From 4ff1e2955f67954e60562b29a00adea89e5b93ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 05:49:23 +0800
> Subject: [PATCH 3/3 V3] XSA-60 security hole: cr0.cd handling
> 
> This patch solves XSA-60 security hole:
> 1. For guest w/o VT-d, and for guest with VT-d but snooped, Xen need
> do nothing, since hardware snoop mechanism has ensured cache coherency.
> 
> 2. For guest with VT-d but non-snooped, cache coherency can not be
> guaranteed by h/w snoop, therefore it need emulate UC type to guest:
> 2.1). if it works w/ Intel EPT, set guest IA32_PAT fields as UC so that
> guest memory type are all UC.
> 2.2). if it works w/ shadow, drop all shadows so that any new ones would
> be created on demand w/ UC.
> 
> This patch also fix a bug of shadow cr0.cd setting. Current shadow has a
> small window between cache flush and TLB invalidation, resulting in possilbe
> cache pollution. This patch pause vcpus so that no vcpus context involved
> into the window. 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel