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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [DRAFT] Coverity Access Policy
On Tue, 2013-09-24 at 13:35 -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 03:14:52PM +0100, Ian Campbell wrote:
> > I've tried to codify some of the ideas put forward in the previous
> > thread and round out the proposal with some practicalities.
> >
> > I was undecided about requiring unanimity (i.e no objections from a
> > maintainer) rather than just consensus. Any thoughts on that? A (well
> > reasoned) objection should carry a fair bit of weight under these
> > circumstances I think.
> >
> > 8<--------------------------------
> >
> > The Xen Project is registered with the "Coverity Scan" service[0]
> > which applies Coverity's static analyser to the Open Source
> > projects. The tool can and does find flaws in the source code which
> > can include security issues.
> >
> > Triaging and proposing solutions for the flaws found by Coverity is a
> > useful way in which Community members can contribute to the Xen
> > Project. However because the service may discover security issues and
> > the Xen Project practices responsible disclosure as described in "Xen
> > Security Problem Response Process"[1] the full database of issues
> > cannot simply be made public.
> >
> > Members of the community may request access to the Coverity database
> > under the condition that for any security issues discovered, they:
> >
> > * agree to follow the security response process[1].
> > * undertake to report security issues discovered to the security team
> > (security@xxxxxxx) within 3 days of discovery.
> > * waive their right to select the disclosure time line. Discoveries
> > will follow the default time lines given in the policy.
> > * agree to not disclose any issue discovered other than to the
> > security team, unless this has been approved by the security team.
>
> Perhaps that sentence above could be changed to:
>
> * agree to disclose issues discovered to the security team. Unless the
> security team has given approval to publicily disclose it.
I don't think this wording quite so clearly excludes telling your
friends/blackhats/people in the pub.
I prefer my original wording.
>
> Otherwise:
>
> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> >
> > Requests should be made to the public xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > mailing list. The request must:
> >
> > * use a subject line prefixed "[COVERITY ACCESS] <Name>".
> > * signal acceptance of the above conditions.
> > * include a short bio of the requester, covering who they are, what,
> > if any, their previous involvement with Xen has been (with
> > references to patches etc), their security background and if they
> > have not been previously involved with Xen why they are interested
> > specifically in the Xen project.
> > * be signed by a PGP key which is part of the strong set of the PGP
> > web of trust[2].
> >
> > These last two items serve to help validate the identity and
> > trustworthiness of the person since they will be given access to
> > potentially sensitive information.
> >
> > Seven days will be given for responses. Following the "Consensus
> > Decision Making" process described in the project governance
> > document[3]. The request must be publicly seconded ('+1') by at least
> > one maintainer. Objections ('-1') may be raised but must contain a
> > rationale.
> >
> > [0] https://scan.coverity.com/faq
> > [1] http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
> > [2] In practice this will be taken to mean that there is a path from a
> > member of the Xen.org security team's key to the key. Several
> > members of the security team have keys in the strong set.
> > [3] http://www.xenproject.org/governance.html
> >
> >
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