[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next V7 3/4] xen-netback: coalesce slots in TX path and fix regressions
>>> On 22.04.13 at 14:20, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > @@ -898,47 +928,78 @@ static void netbk_fatal_tx_err(struct xenvif *vif) > > static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif, > struct xen_netif_tx_request *first, > + RING_IDX first_idx, > struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp, > int work_to_do) > { > RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons; It looks bogus and confusing to me to pass first_idx into this function when this really is the same as cons. Jan > - int frags = 0; > + int slots = 0; > + int drop_err = 0; > > if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data)) > return 0; > > do { > - if (frags >= work_to_do) { > - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Need more frags\n"); > + if (slots >= work_to_do) { > + netdev_err(vif->dev, > + "Asked for %d slots but exceeds this > limit\n", > + work_to_do); > netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); > return -ENODATA; > } > > - if (unlikely(frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) { > - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Too many frags\n"); > + /* This guest is really using too many slots and > + * considered malicious. > + */ > + if (unlikely(slots >= max_skb_slots)) { > + netdev_err(vif->dev, > + "Malicious frontend using %d slots, > threshold %u\n", > + slots, max_skb_slots); > netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); > return -E2BIG; > } > > - memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + frags), > + /* Xen network protocol had implicit dependency on > + * MAX_SKB_FRAGS. XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN is set to the > + * historical MAX_SKB_FRAGS value 18 to honor the same > + * behavior as before. Any packet using more than 18 > + * slots but less than max_skb_slots slots is dropped > + */ > + if (!drop_err && slots >= XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN) { > + if (net_ratelimit()) > + netdev_dbg(vif->dev, > + "Too many slots (%d) exceeding limit > (%d), dropping packet\n", > + slots, XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN); > + drop_err = -E2BIG; > + } > + > + memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots), > sizeof(*txp)); > if (txp->size > first->size) { > - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Frag is bigger than frame.\n"); > + netdev_err(vif->dev, > + "Invalid tx request, slot size %u > > remaining size %u\n", > + txp->size, first->size); > netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); > return -EIO; > } > > first->size -= txp->size; > - frags++; > + slots++; > > if (unlikely((txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE)) { > - netdev_err(vif->dev, "txp->offset: %x, size: %u\n", > + netdev_err(vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txp->offset: > %x, size: %u\n", > txp->offset, txp->size); > netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); > return -EINVAL; > } > } while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data); > - return frags; > + > + if (drop_err) { > + netbk_tx_err(vif, first, first_idx + slots); > + return drop_err; > + } > + > + return slots; > } > > static struct page *xen_netbk_alloc_page(struct xen_netbk *netbk, _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |