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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next V7 3/4] xen-netback: coalesce slots in TX path and fix regressions
>>> On 22.04.13 at 14:20, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> @@ -898,47 +928,78 @@ static void netbk_fatal_tx_err(struct xenvif *vif)
>
> static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
> struct xen_netif_tx_request *first,
> + RING_IDX first_idx,
> struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
> int work_to_do)
> {
> RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons;
It looks bogus and confusing to me to pass first_idx into this
function when this really is the same as cons.
Jan
> - int frags = 0;
> + int slots = 0;
> + int drop_err = 0;
>
> if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data))
> return 0;
>
> do {
> - if (frags >= work_to_do) {
> - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Need more frags\n");
> + if (slots >= work_to_do) {
> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
> + "Asked for %d slots but exceeds this
> limit\n",
> + work_to_do);
> netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
> return -ENODATA;
> }
>
> - if (unlikely(frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
> - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Too many frags\n");
> + /* This guest is really using too many slots and
> + * considered malicious.
> + */
> + if (unlikely(slots >= max_skb_slots)) {
> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
> + "Malicious frontend using %d slots,
> threshold %u\n",
> + slots, max_skb_slots);
> netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
> return -E2BIG;
> }
>
> - memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + frags),
> + /* Xen network protocol had implicit dependency on
> + * MAX_SKB_FRAGS. XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN is set to the
> + * historical MAX_SKB_FRAGS value 18 to honor the same
> + * behavior as before. Any packet using more than 18
> + * slots but less than max_skb_slots slots is dropped
> + */
> + if (!drop_err && slots >= XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN) {
> + if (net_ratelimit())
> + netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
> + "Too many slots (%d) exceeding limit
> (%d), dropping packet\n",
> + slots, XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN);
> + drop_err = -E2BIG;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots),
> sizeof(*txp));
> if (txp->size > first->size) {
> - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Frag is bigger than frame.\n");
> + netdev_err(vif->dev,
> + "Invalid tx request, slot size %u >
> remaining size %u\n",
> + txp->size, first->size);
> netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
> return -EIO;
> }
>
> first->size -= txp->size;
> - frags++;
> + slots++;
>
> if (unlikely((txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE)) {
> - netdev_err(vif->dev, "txp->offset: %x, size: %u\n",
> + netdev_err(vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txp->offset:
> %x, size: %u\n",
> txp->offset, txp->size);
> netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> } while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data);
> - return frags;
> +
> + if (drop_err) {
> + netbk_tx_err(vif, first, first_idx + slots);
> + return drop_err;
> + }
> +
> + return slots;
> }
>
> static struct page *xen_netbk_alloc_page(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
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