[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] hvm: convert access check for nested HVM to XSM
This adds an XSM hook for enabling nested HVM support, replacing an IS_PRIV check. This hook is a partial duplicate with the xsm_hvm_param hook, but using the existing hook would require adding the index to the hook and would require the use of a custom hook for the xsm-disabled case (using XSM_OTHER, which is less immediately readable) - whereas adding a new hook retains the clarity of the existing code. Defining this new permission allows a security policy writer to allow only certain guest types to use nested HVM features, or to disable it completely. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> --- tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if | 3 ++- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 6 ++---- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 6 ++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 2 ++ 7 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if b/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if index fbb329d..f6f24a5 100644 --- a/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if +++ b/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ define(`create_domain_common', ` allow $1 $2:shadow enable; allow $1 $2:mmu { map_read map_write adjust memorymap physmap pinpage mmuext_op }; allow $1 $2:grant setup; - allow $1 $2:hvm { cacheattr getparam hvmctl irqlevel pciroute sethvmc setparam pcilevel trackdirtyvram }; + allow $1 $2:hvm { cacheattr getparam hvmctl irqlevel pciroute sethvmc + setparam pcilevel trackdirtyvram nested }; ') # create_domain(priv, target) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index ea7adf6..49b656e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -3911,11 +3911,9 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) rc = -EINVAL; break; case HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM: - if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) - { - rc = -EPERM; + rc = xsm_hvm_param_nested(XSM_PRIV, d); + if ( rc ) break; - } if ( a.value > 1 ) rc = -EINVAL; /* Remove the check below once we have diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index 7986cda..4d63cf1 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -491,6 +491,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, unsigned l return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); } +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_hvm_param_nested(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) +{ + XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV); + return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86 static XSM_INLINE int xsm_shadow_control(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, uint32_t op) { diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index d8ee0c8..9d3f214 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ struct xsm_operations { long (*do_xsm_op) (XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xsm_op_t) op); int (*hvm_param) (struct domain *d, unsigned long op); + int (*hvm_param_nested) (struct domain *d); #ifdef CONFIG_X86 int (*shadow_control) (struct domain *d, uint32_t op); @@ -511,6 +512,11 @@ static inline int xsm_hvm_param (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, unsigned l return xsm_ops->hvm_param(d, op); } +static inline int xsm_hvm_param_nested (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) +{ + return xsm_ops->hvm_param_nested(d); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86 static inline int xsm_shadow_control (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, uint32_t op) { diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c index 7235d82..49f4fb8 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c +++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, tmem_op); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, tmem_control); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_param); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, hvm_param_nested); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, do_xsm_op); diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index ca42891..7909ad5 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -1107,6 +1107,11 @@ static int flask_hvm_param(struct domain *d, unsigned long op) return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, perm); } +static int flask_hvm_param_nested(struct domain *d) +{ + return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_HVM, HVM__NESTED); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_X86 static int flask_shadow_control(struct domain *d, uint32_t op) { @@ -1524,6 +1529,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = { .tmem_op = flask_tmem_op, .tmem_control = flask_tmem_control, .hvm_param = flask_hvm_param, + .hvm_param_nested = flask_hvm_param_nested, .do_xsm_op = do_flask_op, diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors index 05bb52e..0b83fbb 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors @@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ class hvm # source = domain whose memory is being shared # target = client domain share_mem +# HVMOP_set_param setting HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM + nested } # Class event describes event channels. Interdomain event channels have their -- 1.8.1.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |