[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only

On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 11:39 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 04/09/2013 11:31 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> ...
>>>> 0xffff880001e00000-0xffff88001fe00000         480M     RW         PSE GLB 
>>>> NX pmd
>>> That is the 1:1 memory map area...
>> Meaning what?
>> -Kees
> That's the area in which we just map 1:1 to memory.  Anything allocated
> with e.g. kmalloc() ends up with those addresses.

Ah-ha! Yes, I see now when comparing the debug/kernel_page_tables
reports. It's just the High Kernel Mapping that we care about.
Addresses outside that range are less of a leak. Excellent, then GDT
may not be a problem. Whew.

Does the v2 IDT patch look okay, BTW?


Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.