[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Bug on shadow page mode
At 11:18 +0100 on 04 Apr (1365074288), Tim Deegan wrote: > Hi, > > At 12:50 +0100 on 02 Apr (1364907054), Jan Beulich wrote: > > > (XEN) Xen call trace: > > > (XEN) [<ffff82c4c01e637f>] guest_walk_tables_4_levels+0x135/0x6a6 > > > (XEN) [<ffff82c4c020d8cc>] sh_page_fault__guest_4+0x505/0x2015 > > > (XEN) [<ffff82c4c01d2135>] vmx_vmexit_handler+0x86c/0x1748 > > > (XEN) > > > (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff82c406a00000: > > > (XEN) L4[0x105] = 000000007f26e063 ffffffffffffffff > > > (XEN) L3[0x110] = 000000005ce30063 ffffffffffffffff > > > (XEN) L2[0x035] = 0000000014aab063 ffffffffffffffff > > > (XEN) L1[0x000] = 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff > > > > Tim, > > > > I'm afraid this is something for you. From what I can tell, despite > > sh_walk_guest_tables() being called from sh_page_fault() without > > the paging lock held, there doesn't appear to be a way for this to > > race sh_update_cr3(). And with the way the latter updates > > guest_vtable, the only way for a page fault to happen upon use > > of that cached mapping would be between the call to > > sh_unmap_domain_page_global() and the immediately following > > one to sh_map_domain_page_global() (i.e. while the pointer is > > stale). > > Hmmm. So the only way I can see that happening is if some foreign agent > resets the vcpu's state while it's actually running, which AFAICT > shouldn't happen. OTOH, looking at map_domain_page_global, there doesn't seem to be any locking preventing two CPUs from populating a page of global-map l1es at the same time. So, here's a different patch to test -- it would be good to know if this patch by itself fixes the crash. Tim. diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c index 7421e03..efda6af 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_page.c @@ -354,9 +354,10 @@ void *map_domain_page_global(unsigned long mfn) set_bit(idx, inuse); inuse_cursor = idx + 1; + pl1e = virt_to_xen_l1e(va); + spin_unlock(&globalmap_lock); - pl1e = virt_to_xen_l1e(va); if ( !pl1e ) return NULL; l1e_write(pl1e, l1e_from_pfn(mfn, __PAGE_HYPERVISOR)); _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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