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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-unstable test] 15180: trouble: broken/fail/pass
flight 15180 xen-unstable real [real] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/15180/ Failures and problems with tests :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 3 host-install(3) broken REGR. vs. 15179 Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking): test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin 5 xen-boot fail like 15179 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf 5 xen-boot fail like 15179 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win 13 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen 621b1a889e9b baseline version: xen 5af4f2ab06f3 ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@xxxxxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-i386 pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 broken test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin fail test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf fail test-amd64-i386-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-amd64-win fail test-amd64-i386-win fail test-amd64-amd64-qemut-win fail test-amd64-i386-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win fail test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs images: /home/xc_osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ changeset: 26444:621b1a889e9b tag: tip user: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> date: Wed Jan 23 11:47:24 2013 +0100 xen: Do not allow guests to enable nested HVM on themselves There is no reason for this and doing so exposes a memory leak to guests. Only toolstacks need write access to this HVM param. This is XSA-35 / CVE-2013-0152. Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> changeset: 26443:9efe4c0bf9c8 user: Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@xxxxxxxxxx> date: Wed Jan 23 10:31:04 2013 +0100 fix acpi_dmar_zap/reinstate() (fixes S3 regression) Fix S3 regression introduced by cs 23013:65d26504e843 (ACPI: large cleanup). The dmar virtual pointer returned from acpi_get_table cannot be safely stored away and used later, as the underlying acpi_os_map_memory / __acpi_map_table functions overwrite the mapping causing it to point to different tables than dmar (last fetched table is used). This subsequently causes acpi_dmar_reinstate() and acpi_dmar_zap() to write data to wrong table, causing its corruption and problems with consecutive s3 resumes. Added a new function to fetch ACPI table physical address, and establishing separate static mapping for dmar_table pointer instead of using acpi_get_table(). Signed-off-by: Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@xxxxxxxxxx> Added call to acpi_tb_verify_table(). Fixed page count passed to map_pages_to_xen(). Cosmetic changes. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> changeset: 26442:7c6ecf2c1831 user: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> date: Wed Jan 23 09:18:50 2013 +0000 xen/arch/x86: complete XSM hooks on irq/pirq mappings Manipulation of a domain's pirq namespace was not fully protected by XSM hooks because the XSM hooks for IRQs needed a physical IRQ. Since this may not apply to HVM domains, a complete solution needs to split the XSM hook for this operation, using one hook for the PIRQ manipulation and one for controlling access to the hardware IRQ. This reworking has the advantage of providing the same MSI data to remove_irq that is provided to add_irq, allowing the PCI device to be determined in both functions. It also eliminates the last callers of rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id in x86 and common code in preparation for this function's removal. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> changeset: 26441:07d6d8bee6d7 user: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> date: Wed Jan 23 09:17:19 2013 +0000 hvm: wire up domctl and xsm hypercalls These hypercalls are usable by HVM guests. Once connected, simple functions of the Xen toolstack can be run from an HVM domain if that domain is permitted access (which is currently only possible via XSM). Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> changeset: 26440:5af4f2ab06f3 user: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> date: Tue Jan 22 09:33:10 2013 +0100 x86: restore (optional) forwarding of PCI SERR induced NMI to Dom0 c/s 22949:54fe1011f86b removed the forwarding of NMIs to Dom0 when they were caused by PCI SERR. NMI buttons as well as BMCs (like HP's iLO) may however want such events to be seen in Dom0 (e.g. to trigger a dump). Therefore restore most of the functionality which named c/s removed (adjusted for subsequent changes, and adjusting the public interface to use the modern term, retaining the old one for backwards compatibility). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> ======================================== commit 2a1354d655d816feaad7dbdb8364f40a208439c1 Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu Jan 17 15:52:16 2013 +0000 e1000: fix compile warning introduced by security fix, and debugging e33f918c19e393900b95a2bb6b10668dfe96a8f2, the fix for XSA-41, and its cherry picks in 4.2 and 4.1 introduced this compiler warning: hw/e1000.c:641: warning: 'return' with a value, in function returning void In upstream qemu (where this change came from), e1000_receive returns a value used by queueing machinery to decide whether to try resubmitting the packet later. Returning "size" means that the packet has been dealt with and should not be retried. In this old branch (aka qemu-xen-traditional), this machinery is absent and e1000_receive returns void. Fix the return statement. Also add a debugging statement along the lines of the others in this function. Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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