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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] nEPT: handle invept instruction from L1 VMM
Thanks, Jan!
>>: handle invept instruction from L1 VMM
>
> >>> On 19.12.12 at 20:44, Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -2572,11 +2572,13 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct
> cpu_user_regs *regs)
> > if ( nvmx_handle_vmresume(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
> > update_guest_eip();
> > break;
> > -
> > + case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT:
> > + if ( nvmx_handle_invept(regs) == X86EMUL_OKAY )
> > + update_guest_eip();
> > + break;
>
> In (potentially going to become) long switch statements, please don't drop
> the blank lines between individual cases - instead of dropping the line here,
> you wold want to insert another one below the new separately handled case.
Okay.
> > case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
> > case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
> > case EXIT_REASON_GETSEC:
> > - case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT:
> > case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
> > /*
> > * We should never exit on GETSEC because CR4.SMXE is always
> > 0 when
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> > @@ -1356,6 +1356,45 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs
> *regs)
> > return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> > }
> >
> > +int nvmx_handle_invept(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) {
> > + struct vmx_inst_decoded decode;
> > + unsigned long eptp;
> > + u64 inv_type;
> > +
> > + if ( !cpu_has_vmx_ept )
> > + return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
> > +
> > + if ( decode_vmx_inst(regs, &decode, &eptp, 0)
> > + != X86EMUL_OKAY )
> > + return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
> > +
> > + inv_type = reg_read(regs, decode.reg2);
> > + gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG,"inv_type:%ld, eptp:%lx\n", inv_type,
> > + eptp);
>
> An unconditional printk() on an operation potentially happening quite
> frequently? Even with XENLOG_DEBUG this is not acceptable imo.
Okay, I will remove it.
> > +
> > + switch ( inv_type ) {
> > + case INVEPT_SINGLE_CONTEXT:
> > + {
> > + struct p2m_domain *p2m = vcpu_nestedhvm(current).nv_p2m;
> > + if ( p2m )
> > + {
> > + p2m_flush(current, p2m);
>
> Despite your comment in 00/10, there still is a whitespace issues at least
> here
> (didn't look that closely elsewhere).
Fixed.
> > + ept_sync_domain(p2m);
> > + }
> > + }
> > + break;
> > + case INVEPT_ALL_CONTEXT:
> > + p2m_flush_nestedp2m(current->domain);
> > + __invept(INVEPT_ALL_CONTEXT, 0, 0);
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
> > + }
> > + vmreturn(regs, VMSUCCEED);
> > + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > #define __emul_value(enable1, default1) \
> > ((enable1 | default1) << 32 | (default1))
> >
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> > @@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ p2m_flush_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m) void
> > p2m_flush(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m) {
> > - ASSERT(v->domain == p2m->domain);
> > + ASSERT(p2m && v->domain == p2m->domain);
>
> How is this change related to the rest of the patch?
I will remove it, and let caller check whether p2m is NULL. Originally, this
is to fix a Xen booting issue.
Xiantao
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