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Re: [Xen-devel] [Patch 0/6] Xen vMCE implement

Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 27.07.12 at 17:28, "Liu, Jinsong" <jinsong.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>> wrote: Comments? 
> It didn't get lost, but I didn't get to it yet. Some time next week,
> hopefully.
> Jan

I see, thanks!


>> Liu, Jinsong wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>> These patches are Xen vMCE implement, among them
>>> ===================
>>> Patch 1: This patch is a middle-work patch, prepare for future new
>>> vMCE model. It remove mci_ctl array, and keep MCi_CTL all 1's.
>>> Patch 2: This patch is a middle-work patch, prepare for future new
>>> vMCE model. It remove mcg_ctl, disable MCG_CTL_P, and set bank
>>> number to 2. 
>>> Patch 3: vMCE emulation
>>> This patch provides virtual MCE support to guest. It emulates a
>>> simple and clean MCE MSRs interface to guest by faking caps to guest
>>> if needed and masking caps if unnecessary:
>>> 1. Providing a well-defined MCG_CAP to guest, filter out
>>> un-necessary caps and provide only guest needed caps;
>>> 2. Disabling MCG_CTL to avoid model specific;
>>> 3. Sticking all 1's to MCi_CTL to guest to avoid model specific;
>>> 4. Enabling CMCI cap but never really inject to guest to prevent
>>> polling periodically; 
>>> 5. Masking MSCOD field of MCi_STATUS to avoid model specific;
>>> 6. Keeping natural semantics by per-vcpu instead of per-domain
>>> variables; 
>>> 7. Using bank1 and reserving bank0 to work around 'bank0 quirk' of
>>> some very old processors; 
>>> 8. Cleaning some vMCE# injection logic which shared by Intel and AMD
>>> but useless under new vMCE implement;
>>> 9. Keeping compatilbe w/ old xen version which has been backported
>>> to SLES11 SP2, so that old vMCE would not blocked when migrate to
>>> new vMCE; 
>>> Patch 4: vMCE injection
>>> In our test for win8 guest mce, we find a bug that no matter what
>>> SRAO/SRAR error xen inject to win8 guest, it always reboot. The root
>>> cause is, current Xen vMCE logic inject vMCE# only to vcpu0, this is
>>> not correct for Intel MCE (Under Intel arch, h/w generate MCE# to
>>> all CPUs). This patch fix vMCE injection bug, injecting vMCE# to
>>> all vcpus. 
>>> Patch 5: vMCE save and restore
>>> This patch provide vMCE save/restore when migration.
>>> 1. MCG_CAP is well-defined. However, considering future cap
>>> extension, we keep save/restore logic that Jan implement at c/s
>>> 24887; 
>>> 2. MCi_CTL2 initialized by guestos when booting, so need
>>> save/restore otherwise guest would surprise;
>>> 3. Other MSRs do not need save/restore since they are either
>>> error-related and pointless to save/restore, or, unified among all
>>> vMCE platform; 
>>> Patch 6: Cleanup guest vMCE check
>>> This patch simplify vMCE logic by removing guest vMCE check, since
>>> hypervisor should be agnostic to guest.
>>> With guest vMCE check, hypervisor would actively kill guest when
>>> guest vMCE not ready. Without guest vMCE check, hypervisor would
>>> always inject vMCE to guest: if guest ready it would happily handle
>>> it, and if guest not ready, it automatically kill itself.
>>> ==================== 
>>> These patches have been tested w/ Linux and Windows 8 guestos, and
>>> worked fine. 
>>> Considering Intel and AMD common vMCE interface to guest, these
>>> patches are mainly put in vmce.c (except mci_ctl2 in intel specific
>>> code since this MSRs are supported by Intel only). AMD code could
>>> update them according to AMD's specific requirement.
>>> These patches didn't handle the corner case 'MCE occur when live
>>> migration'. We have draftly done the patch for the corner case but
>>> meet issue now (seems caused from Xen live migration logic itself,
>>> we are debugging it now, and would present soon when it fixed).
>>> Thanks,
>>> Jinsong
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Xen-devel mailing list
>>> Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

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