|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1 of 7] Tools: Sanitize mem_event/access/paging interfaces
On Thu, 2012-02-23 at 06:05 +0000, Andres Lagar-Cavilla wrote:
> tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c | 10 ++++++++--
> tools/libxc/xc_mem_event.c | 13 ++++++++-----
> tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c | 10 ++++++++--
> tools/libxc/xenctrl.h | 6 +++---
> tools/tests/xen-access/xen-access.c | 22 ++++------------------
> tools/xenpaging/xenpaging.c | 18 +++---------------
> tools/xenpaging/xenpaging.h | 2 +-
> xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c | 33 +++------------------------------
> xen/include/public/domctl.h | 4 ++--
> xen/include/public/mem_event.h | 4 ----
> xen/include/xen/sched.h | 2 --
> 11 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
>
>
> Don't use the superfluous shared page, return the event channel directly as
> part of the domctl struct, instead.
>
> In-tree consumers (xenpaging, xen-access) updated. This is an ABI/API change,
> so please voice any concerns.
>
> Known pending issues:
> - pager could die and its ring page could be used by some other process, yet
> Xen retains the mapping to it.
> - use a saner interface for the paging_load buffer.
>
> This change also affects the x86/mm bits in the hypervisor that process the
> mem_event setup domctl.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andres@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> diff -r 8ddd13cc783e -r 3b24188d8815 tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_access.c
> @@ -25,12 +25,18 @@
>
>
> int xc_mem_access_enable(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
> - void *shared_page, void *ring_page)
> + uint32_t *port, void *ring_page)
> {
> + if ( !port )
> + {
> + errno = -EINVAL;
Aren't errno vals normally +ve?
Is there any situation where port==NULL would be valid, i.e. any chance
that this might happen, or are such callers just buggy?
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> return xc_mem_event_control(xch, domain_id,
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS_ENABLE,
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_ACCESS,
> - shared_page, ring_page);
> + port, ring_page);
> }
>
> int xc_mem_access_disable(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id)
> diff -r 8ddd13cc783e -r 3b24188d8815 tools/libxc/xc_mem_event.c
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_event.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_event.c
> @@ -24,19 +24,22 @@
> #include "xc_private.h"
>
> int xc_mem_event_control(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id, unsigned int
> op,
> - unsigned int mode, void *page, void *ring_page)
> + unsigned int mode, uint32_t *port, void *ring_page)
> {
> DECLARE_DOMCTL;
> + int rc;
>
> domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_mem_event_op;
> domctl.domain = domain_id;
> domctl.u.mem_event_op.op = op;
> domctl.u.mem_event_op.mode = mode;
> -
> - domctl.u.mem_event_op.shared_addr = (unsigned long)page;
> - domctl.u.mem_event_op.ring_addr = (unsigned long)ring_page;
> + domctl.u.mem_event_op.ring_addr = (unsigned long) ring_page;
>
> - return do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
> + errno = 0;
> + rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl);
> + if ( !rc && port )
> + *port = domctl.u.mem_event_op.port;
> + return rc;
Clearing errno is an unusual pattern, normally callers only expect errno
to contain a valid value on failure. Are you trying to provide some
backwards compatibility with something or is there another reason for
doing it this way?
> }
>
> int xc_mem_event_memop(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
> diff -r 8ddd13cc783e -r 3b24188d8815 tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
> --- a/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
> +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_mem_paging.c
> @@ -25,12 +25,18 @@
>
>
> int xc_mem_paging_enable(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domain_id,
> - void *shared_page, void *ring_page)
> + uint32_t *port, void *ring_page)
> {
> + if ( !port )
> + {
> + errno = -EINVAL;
Same comments as before.
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> return xc_mem_event_control(xch, domain_id,
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_PAGING_ENABLE,
> XEN_DOMCTL_MEM_EVENT_OP_PAGING,
> - shared_page, ring_page);
> + port, ring_page);
> }
>
Ian.
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |