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[Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86-32/pod: fix map_domain_page() leak



The 'continue' in the if() part of the conditional at the end of
p2m_pod_zero_check() was causing this, but there also really is no
point in retaining the mapping after having checked page contents,
so fix it both ways. Additionally there is no point in updating
map[] at this point anymore.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxxxx>

--- 2009-11-30.orig/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c       2009-11-26 13:58:20.000000000 
+0100
+++ 2009-11-30/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c    2009-12-09 10:56:02.000000000 +0100
@@ -898,12 +898,13 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct domain *d, uns
             if( *(map[i]+j) != 0 )
                 break;
 
+        unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
+
         /* See comment in p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage() re gnttab
          * check timing.  */
         if ( j < PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(*map[i]) )
         {
             set_p2m_entry(d, gfns[i], mfns[i], 0, types[i]);
-            continue;
         }
         else
         {
@@ -911,9 +912,6 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct domain *d, uns
             p2m_pod_cache_add(d, mfn_to_page(mfns[i]), 0);
             d->arch.p2m->pod.entry_count++;
         }
-
-        unmap_domain_page(map[i]);
-        map[i] = NULL;
     }
     
 }



Attachment: xen-x86-p2m-pod-map-leak.patch
Description: Text document

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