[MirageOS-devel] new nocrypto/x509/tls releases

[Hannes Mehnert <hannes@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

hey,

David tagged nocrypto-0.5.2
===========================
 - avoids the opam variable nocrypto-inhibit-modernity, uses the
environment variable NOCRYPTO_NO_ACCEL instead (this makes
opam-1.2.0/1.2.1 happy)!
 - does not include intrinsic-related headers if SSE/AES-NI is disabled
(e.g. on OpenBSD).

API documentation at https://mirleft.github.io/ocaml-nocrypto/

X.509 0.5.0 brings you
======================
 - public key fingerprint verification (in addition to now deprecated
certificate fingerprint verification)
 - building certificate paths from the received set (RFC 4158) instead
of requiring a strict chain (if the other side sends the trust
anchor/self-signed certificate, this is ok now; or if the other side
sends the chain in the wrong order)
 - trust anchors given to Authenticator.chain_of_trust are not validated
(to contain KeyUsage / BasicConstraint extensions) anymore, users have
to use valid_ca and valid_cas to filter CAs upfront (previously there
was a whitelist of CAcert certificates which are ok to not have a
KeyUsage X.509v3 extension, but this whitelist did not scale).

The main reason for this change is that if the user provides us with a
set of trust anchors, the user actually knows what they are doing (and,
as described in RFC 5280, a trust anchor is identified by its issuer
(ASN.1 distinguished name) and public key.

The path building results in slightly different validation failures
(since now, instead of a single chain, we build a set of chains, and
report `InvalidChain to the user).  You can manually build_paths and
verify_chain individually.

API documentation at https://mirleft.github.io/ocaml-x509/


TLS 0.7.0
=========
- session resumption (interface: server side can pass a `session_hash :
SessionID.t -> epoch_data option` function, client can provide a
`cached_session : epoch_data`) [SessionID is a OrderedType and HashedType)
- session hash and extended master secret support (security mitigation
for secure-resumption)
- both lwt and mirage layers block if renegotiation is in progress (some
inconsistency we found when running the tls demo server, and by now we
have a clue what the right thing to do is)
- the mirage layer had a concurrency problem if read and write was
called from different tasks (the same was present at an earlier point in
the lwt layer as well)
- public key pinning instead of certificate pinning interface
- the "tls/" prefix was dropped from certificate and keys in the mirage
X.509 module (all your application won't be able to find their keys
anymore, sorry)

The default TLS configuration no longer enables renegotiation (since
renegotiation together with resumption is insecure (if the other side
does not implement session hash) to enable session resumption in more
scenarios.

Client
------
To enable resumption on the client side, some code like the following is
needed:
 let config = Tls.Config.client ~authenticator ~cached_session () in
 lwt (ic, oc) = Tls_lwt.connect_ext config (host, port) in

where cached_session can be retrieved from an already established
earlier session in the following way:
  lwt t = Tls_lwt.Unix.connect config (host, port) in
  let cached_session = match Tls_lwt.Unix.epoch t with
    | `Ok e -> e
    | `Error -> invalid_arg "error retrieving epoch"
  in

Server
------
For a server it would be great to have a standalone LRU cache package,
but there is none in opam (although ocaml-git, containers, ... all
implement LRU caches).

The cache:
module HT = Hashtbl.Make (Tls.Core.SessionID)
let add_session_to_cache, session_cache =
  let cache = HT.create 7 in
  ((fun ed -> HT.add cache ed.Tls.Core.session_id ed),
   (fun id -> if HT.mem cache id then Some (HT.find cache id) else None))

and once a session is established, insert it:
Tls_lwt.Unix.accept config s  >>= fun (t, addr) ->
(match Tls_lwt.Unix.epoch t with
| `Ok e -> add_session_to_cache ed
| `Error -> ()) ;
handle (Tls_lwt.of_t t) addr

And pass the session_cache function to Tls.Config.server.


Still waiting for https://github.com/ocaml/opam-repository/pull/5248

Happy hacking and please report problems,

Hannes

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