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xen-users
RE: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gregory Gee [mailto:gregory.gee@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: 05 October 2006 01:45
> To: Petersson, Mats
> Cc: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
>
> Petersson, Mats wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> [mailto:xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> >> Gregory Gee
> >> Sent: 04 October 2006 14:20
> >> To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
> >>
> >> Thorolf Godawa wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> I'm not sure if it's part of the translation or some
> other sort of
> >>>> misunderstanding, but chipsets (non-processor components) are not
> >>>> necessary for the AMD-V technology (formerly Pacifica) to operate
> >>>>
> >>> I think he means s.th. related to the problem of the
> >>>
> >> virtualisation of
> >>
> >>> the i/o that the AMD-CPUs should do better than the first
> >>> Intel-implementation of VT.
> >>>
> >>> AMD calls this "AMD I/O Virtualization Technology (IOMMU)
> >>> Specification", you find a PDF here:
> >>>
> >>>
> >> http://www.amd.com/us-en/assets/content_type/white_papers_and_
> >> tech_docs/34434.pdf
> >>
> >>> The "Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O
> >>>
> >> (VTd)" should be
> >>
> >>> implemented in a later version of Intel-VT (see PDF:
> >>>
> >>>
> >> ftp://download.intel.com/technology/computing/vptech/Intel(r)_
> >> VT_for_Direct_IO.pdf
> >>
> >>> ).
> >>>
> >>> But actually I don't know the status of this technique too and if
> >>> there are really advantages for the user right now!
> >>>
> >> Wouldn't this allow PCI pass-through for SVM which isn't
> possible
> >> today? I find PCI pas-through really useful but I can't
> use it for
> >> Windows guest in SVM.
> >>
> >
> > Yes, that and better security are the two key points of this type of
> > technology.
> >
> > The problem with PCI pass-through is that the fully-virtualized OS
> > doesn't know the machine physical address, so when it tries
> to tell the
> > PCI device that it's got some data to work on, it gives the guest
> > physical address - which is most likely NOT the machine physical
> > address. IOMMU allows the mapping of DMA-memory from guest-physical
> > address to machine-physical address.
> >
> > Since we can allow and disallow individual pages to be target to
> > PCI-devices (or any other IO-devices), it allows for better
> security in
> > the system, since a device that has a bug or security hole
> will still be
> > prevented from reading/writing addresses that aren't specifically
> > indicated as "allowed". Just like the MMU inside the CPU allows the
> > application to access some pieces of memory, whilst others are not
> > allowed to be accessed.
> >
> > --
> > Mats
> >
>
> Great, two questions.
>
> 1. Would this allow a PCI device that is not supported in
> Linux to be
> used in a Windows SVM dom?
Yes, there's no reason why support in Linux should have anything to do
with things here - the device driver in Windows would be the only driver
ever accessing the hardware - you'd have to "hide" it from Dom0 to use
it in DomU anyways, so Dom0 would never see that device.
>
> 2. When and would it be available for consumer boards or only Operton
> and high end MB?
Don't know - I would think all types of platforms would get this feature
- but that's just guessing...
--
Mats
>
> Thanks,
> Greg
>
>
>
>
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