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[Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] [PATCH] xen, vtd: Check ownership of a domain cont

To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] [PATCH] xen, vtd: Check ownership of a domain context using internal structures
From: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2011 11:52:03 +0100
Cc: Jiang Yunhong <yunhong.jiang@xxxxxxxxx>, Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
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And in a related note...

What is the implication of the "Devices on a bus behind a bridge look
like they're coming from X:0.0" for passing virtual functions through
to different VMs?  Will it simply not work (since the mapping of X:0.0
can't be owned by both)?  Is there a way it can be made to work
without allowing the virtual function of one domain access to the
memory of the other domain?


On Wed, Jul 27, 2011 at 11:36 AM, George Dunlap
<George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Keir, Jan, et al:
> Can you take a look at this patch to see if you think this is the
> right way to solve this problem?
> This particular patch is still being tested by the partner who saw the
> problem; but a less safe change -- just returning "OK" if the pci
> device didn't exist -- did solve the problem.  It seemed like this
> check was probably there for a reason, so I wanted to keep it in
> place.  (Although the c/s in which this check was introduced,
> 18906:2941b1a9, only mentioned locking changes, not introduction of
> new checks.)
> Thanks,
>  -George

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