Re: [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for

[Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 26/07/2010 11:00, "Tim Deegan" <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> At 10:52 +0100 on 26 Jul (1280141550), Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> On 05/25/2010 04:49 PM, Tim Deegan wrote:
>>> whatever they want, without any Xen hole.  __addr_ok() is therefore
>>> always true for such guests.
>>> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> 
>> Sorry for picking up yet another old patch after two months. :)
>> 
>> Do you have a testcase for this or the other patch in the thread?
> 
> I'm afraid not - this was a very old patch that had been gathering dust
> at the bottom of the XenServer code base.  Calling
> e.g. GNTTABOP_setup_table from inside a HVM guest with the frame_list
> argument somewhere in the Xen virtual address space should trigger it,
> though.

The patch never got applied (to xen-unstable) by the way. We agreed on
xen-unstable:21456, which was a more targeted bug fix.

 -- Keir

> Cheers,
> 
> Tim.



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