|   xense-devel
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules	Patch 
| xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote on 03/09/2007
11:55:11 AM:
 
 > On Fri, 2007-03-09 at 09:43 +0000, Keir Fraser wrote:
 > > On 8/3/07 19:58, "George S. Coker, II" <gscoker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
 > >
 >
 > > > To achieve a very light-weight
 > > > domain, one would like to remove as much functionality from
that domain
 > > > as possible, to include the interrupt handler.  Instead,
there would
 > > > exist a light-weight domain interrupt handler domain that
is responsible
 > > > for this functionality.  These interrupts would manifest
as interdomain
 > > > channels; however, the ipi mechanism remains unless a hook
exists to
 > > > block this code path.  Likewise, the light-weight domains
wouldn't be
 > > > able to close their channels arbitrarily, and require a
check on close
 > > > as well.
 > >
 > > I think this sounds like a microkernel-style 'interrupt server'?
Why would
 > > you want that? And if you did have it, why would you care about
the clients
 > > of this server closing their ends of interdomain event channels?
 > >
 > Fair enough.  I'll remove the close check, although we will still
need a
 > hook in the close code path for cleanup.
 >
 
 There's also a mediation in evtchn_init() [.evtchn_init].
evtchn_init() is called from one since place only and that is domain_create(),
which in turn is behind the xsm_createdomain() mediation call [.createdomain].
I suppose it would be enough to guard the creation of a domain by the xsm_createdomain()
hook only, no?
 
 Stefan
 
 
 > >  -- Keir
 >
 >
 > _______________________________________________
 > Xen-devel mailing list
 > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
 > http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
 
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[Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules	Patch, Alex Williamson
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules Patch, Keir Fraser
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules Patch, Keir Fraser
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules Patch, Keir Fraser
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules	Patch,
Stefan Berger <=
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen	Security	Modules	Patch, Stefan Berger
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen	Security	Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security	Modules Patch, Keir Fraser
Re: [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules	Patch, George S. Coker, II
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