RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH]vtd: Fix for irq bind failure after PCI attaching 32 times

[Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

ping?

On Thu, 3 Feb 2011, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2011, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Thu, 27 Jan 2011, Zhang, Fengzhe wrote:
> > > Hi, Stefano,
> > > 
> > > Here is the calling graph that cause the bug:
> > > 
> > > unregister_real_device (ioemu)
> > >     |
> > >     +----> pt_msix_disable (ioemu)
> > >             |
> > >             +----> xc_domain_unbind_msi_irq (ioemu)
> > >             |       |
> > >             |       +----> do_domctl (xen) ----> arch_do_domctl (xen) 
> > > ----> pt_irq_destroy_bind_vtd (xen)
> > >             |              |
> > >             |              +----> unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq (xen)  //freed 
> > > pirq_to_emuirq
> > >             |
> > >             +----> xc_physdev_unmap_pirq (ioemu)
> > >                    |
> > >                    +----> do_physdev_op (xen) 
> > >                            |
> > >                            +----> physdev_unmap_pirq (xen)
> > >                                    |
> > >                                    +----> unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq (xen)  
> > > //found pirq_to_emuirq already freed, abort
> > >                                    |
> > >                                    +----> unmap_domain_pirq (xen)    
> > > //not called
> > > 
> > > The code path you mentioned is not taken for VF dev as its 
> > > ptdev->machine_irq is 0.
> > 
> > It has just occurred to me that all this only happens with guest
> > cooperation: unregister_real_device is called on pci hotplug in response
> > to guest's action.
> > That means that a guest that doesn't support pci hot-unplug (or a
> > malicious guest) won't do anything in response to the acpi SCI interrupt
> > we send, therefore unregister_real_device will never be called and we
> > will be leaking MSIs in the host!
> > 
> > Of course we could solve it adding a new xenstore command to qemu that
> > calls unregister_real_device directly, but it seems to me that relying
> > on qemu to free some hypervisor/dom0 resources is not a good idea.
> > 
> > Xen knows all the pirq remapped to this domain, so wouldn't it be
> > possible for Xen to call pt_irq_destroy_bind_vtd and physdev_unmap_pirq
> > on domain_kill?
> > I think that Xen shouldn't leak pirqs no matter what the toolstack or
> > qemu do.
> > 
> 
> actually it looks like xen is cleaning up after itself:
> 
> arch_domain_destroy
>         |
>         +--> pci_release_devices
>         |            |
>         |            +--> pci_cleanup_msi
>         |                   |
>         |                   +--> msi_free_irq
>         |                           |
>         |                           +--> iommu_update_ire_from_msi
>         |                               (should clean the vtd binding, like 
> pt_irq_destroy_bind_vtd)
>         |            
>         |            
>         +--> free_domain_pirqs
>                      |
>                      +--> unmap_domain_pirq
> 
> 
> so it doesn't actually matter if the guest supports pci hotplug or not,
> because if it doesn't, xen won't leak any resources anyway.
> Am I right? Could you please confirm this?

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