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xen-devel
[Xen-devel] [PATCH] ioemu: Fix PVFB backend to limit frame buffer size
The recent fix to validate the frontend's frame buffer description
neglected to limit the frame buffer size correctly. This lets a
malicious frontend make the backend attempt to map an arbitrary amount
of guest memory, which could be useful for a denial of service attack
against dom0.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@xxxxxxxxxx>
diff -r 53195719f762 tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c
--- a/tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c Tue May 13 15:08:17 2008 +0100
+++ b/tools/ioemu/hw/xenfb.c Thu May 15 09:37:18 2008 +0200
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ static int xenfb_configure_fb(struct xen
fprintf(stderr,
"FB: frontend fb size %zu limited to %zu\n",
fb_len, fb_len_lim);
+ fb_len = fb_len_lim;
}
if (depth != 8 && depth != 16 && depth != 24 && depth != 32) {
fprintf(stderr,
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